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Abstract. Although there are over 1,600,000 third-party Android apps
in the Google Play Store, little has been conclusively shown about how
their individual (and collective) permission usage has evolved over time.
Recently, Android 6 overhauled the way permissions are granted by users,
by switching to run-time permission requests instead of install-time per-
mission requests. This is a welcome change, but recent research has shown
that many users continue to accept run-time permissions blindly, leaving
them at the mercy of third-party app developers and adversaries. Beyond
intentionally invading privacy, highly privileged apps increase the attack
surface of smartphones and are more attractive targets for adversaries.
This work focuses exclusively on dangerous permissions, i.e., those per-
missions identified by Android as guarding access to sensitive user data.
By taking snapshots of the Google Play Store over a 20-month period,
we characterise changes in the number and type of dangerous permis-
sions used by Android apps when they are updated, to gain a greater
understanding of the evolution of permission usage. We found that ap-
proximately 25,000 apps asked for additional permissions every three
months. Worryingly, we made statistically significant observations that
free apps and highly popular apps were more likely to ask for additional
permissions when they were updated. By looking at patterns in danger-
ous permission usage, we find evidence that suggests developers may still
be failing to correctly specify the permissions their apps need.
Key words: Android; access control; permission evolution; Google Play
Store
1 Introduction
Android is the most popular mobile operating system with 84.7% market share
as of 2015 Q3, outpacing its nearest rival, iOS, at 13.1% [13]. This domination
is fuelled by a myriad of app developers, devices, and consumers existing in a
symbiotic relationship known as the Android ecosystem. Nielson reports that
the average consumer uses over 26 different apps per month, spending more
than one hour per day interacting with their smartphone [16]. This explosion in
smartphone usage has been driven, in part, by the ease with which end-users
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can obtain third-party apps to extend the functionality of their devices. App
marketplaces stand at the center of the ecosystem, acting as repositories for
a plethora of apps, and providing convenient search and download facilities to
satisfy the consumers’ appetite. The Google Play Store is the largest (and only
official) Android marketplace, boasting in excess of 1,600,000 apps [20].
Run-Time Permissions. The Android OS takes a permission-based ap-
proach to guard access to private user data and sensitive APIs. This approach
requires users to explicitly accept (or reject) the permissions requested by an
app. With the release of Android 6 (API level 23), users are no longer forced
to accept (or reject) permissions in their entirety at install-time. Instead, users
now accept (or reject) permissions individually at run-time. This offers added
control, but many users continue to accept permission requests blindly due to
conditioning or lack of understanding [12, 11]. This point is exemplified by Eling
et al. [9] who show that 40.4% of users continued to accept fine-grained, intrusive
and unnecessary permission requests, in spite of the fact that these permission
requests were presented to them at run-time. Moreover, some app developers
force the Android OS to revert to install-time permissions by making their apps
compatible with older Android versions [1], i.e., targeting API level 22 or lower.
Thus run-time permissions, while helpful, are not the panacea they are hoped
to be, as users’ behaviour often diverges from their intentions when it comes
to protecting their privacy [2, 17] and app developers can circumvent the new
system. Even when there is no malicious intent from an app developer, apps
with more permissions contribute a greater attack surface to the smartphone
(in case of exploitable bugs/vulnerabilities) and any trend in app marketplaces
concerning app (over)privilege must be thoroughly understood.
The permissions used by an app usually relate to the provision of the app’s
functionality, but some apps are intentionally permission-hungry, facilitating
greater access to a user’s personal data. Beyond app developers and advertisers
(potentially) benefiting from this behaviour, smartphone security and privacy
can be jeopardised if highly-privileged apps have vulnerabilities that can be ex-
ploited, for example, using permission-redelegation, app collusion, or confused
deputy attacks [7]. Throughout this paper, we focus exclusively on the so-called
dangerous permissions used in Android, i.e., those permissions that guard access
to a user’s confidential data [4]. For this reason, we hereafter refer to dangerous
permissions as simply permissions.
We are motivated to study app permission evolution, also known as permission-
creep, across the entire Google Play Store, to quantify the effect that new ver-
sions of apps have on smartphone privacy/security as they are released into the
app ecosystem. We also aim to understand the reasons for the addition/removal
of permissions. By doing this, we aim to uncover micro- and macro-trends in
the Android app ecosystem, which could potentially motivate future research
directions. Previous research efforts have looked at permission evolution on the
Android platform itself [23], or the evolution of permission usage in Android ad
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libraries [6], without looking at the changes in permission usage at the app level
or across the entire Google Play Store. We consider this a critical gap in the
literature and the underlying motivation for our work. Other work has looked
at the Google Play Store to understand developer behaviour and pricing [8] but
neither at the breadth of our work (we analyse an order of magnitude more apps)
nor to understand micro- or macro-trends.
Contributions. Our paper makes the following contributions:
– An evaluation of permission evolution across approximately 1,600,000 apps in
the Google Play Store over a 20-month period.
– An analysis of the number and types of permissions that are being added to
(or removed from) apps, and how app attributes (such as cost or popularity)
contribute to the likelihood of changes in permission usage.
– An understanding of the reasons for permission additions/removals in apps.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 surveys related work;
Section 3 describes our dataset and the data collection methodology; Section 4
reports observations made from our dataset; Section 5 presents an analysis of
permission usage and evolution across the dataset; Section 6 discusses our results,
the limitations of our work, and future work; and finally Section 7 concludes the
paper.
2 Related Work
Viennot et al. performed the first large scale analysis of the Google Play Store
using a tool they call PlayDrone to index and analyse over 1.1 million apps [22].
They decompiled and obtained the source code for over 880,000 free apps. The
authors characterised the content of the Google Play Store, measured library
usage in apps, identified duplicate apps, and uncovered weaknesses in how au-
thentication was implemented in many apps. Our work is similar in that we
take snapshots of the entire Google Play store as well, but differs in that our
analysis is longitudinal and is concerned with gaining a greater understanding
of how app permission usage evolves over time and the potential impacts of this
phenomenon on smartphone privacy and security.
More in line with our work, Book et al. do a longitudinal analysis of Android
ad library permissions [6]. The authors investigate a sample of 114,000 apps to
build a chronological map of permission usage in Android ad libraries. Their
analysis reveals that indeed permission usage by ad libraries has increased in
recent years and, worryingly, that these ad libraries have access to permissions
that pose risks to user privacy and security. This work is a step in our direction,
but since ad libraries request a subset of the permissions required by an app, it
fails to capture the full picture of the risk to devices that come from apps on a
whole. Our work expands by taking a holistic approach to looking at permission
usage across the entire app.
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Wei et al. go in a tangential direction and characterise permission evolution
on the Android platform itself [23]. They look at changes in the Android permis-
sion model since its first commercial release for smartphones in 2008. They find
that permission growth is aimed towards offering access to new hardware features
and not towards offering more fine-grained control to the user. From a sample
of 237 third-party apps, the authors discover that apps are over-privileged and
use dangerous permissions. The authors also characterise the dangerous permis-
sions required by pre-installed apps (which are difficult to remove) and argue
that the evolution tends to favour the vendors and not the users. The authors
focus mainly on permission evolution within the Android platform itself, while
our work focuses on looking at permission evolution across all third-party apps
in the official Android app market.
Along similar lines, Vidas et al. [21] propose a tool to help mitigate permis-
sion creep by assisting developers to enforce the principle of least privilege [18].
Their tool, implemented as an IDE plugin, analyses app source code and helps
the developer to understand the minimum permissions required for their appli-
cation to run. The authors focus on developers who inadvertently request too
many permissions for reasons such as lack of understanding or expected future
use. They create a permission-API database that understands the permissions
required for particular function calls. From this database, their tool can stati-
cally analyse source code and manifest files to identify extraneous permissions.
Using their tool, the authors examine 34,000 free third-party apps and find that
more than 4% have duplicate permissions in their manifest files. This underscores
the idea that developers are not cautious enough when requesting permissions.
Building on this, our work takes a look at whether there is a systematic permis-
sion creep across apps in the Google Play Store and whether conclusions can be
drawn about the reason for this permission creep.
Finally, Carbunar and Potharaju [8] analyse the Google Play Store to under-
stand developer behaviour when it comes to publishing and pricing apps. They
found that developers are more likely to increase the price of apps when they
are updated. The authors also found that a few elite developers are responsi-
ble for very popular apps and that developers with many apps do not usually
have any popular apps. This important work captures developer behaviour at a
high level, i.e., publishing approaches, pricing, and app popularity. Complemen-
tary to this, we examine developer behaviour at a technical level, by analysing
the security/privacy impact of app updates on the app ecosystem once they do
happen.
3 Dataset Description
Collecting longitudinal data from a large source, such as the Google Play Store,
is an arduous process. This is perhaps the reason that very few studies to date
have focused on app permission usage, either at the magnitude (entire Google
Play Store) or duration (over 1.5 years) that this one has. To gather our data,
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Fig. 1. Highly-scalable cloud-based crawler architecture. The Google Play Store
Crawler (GPSC) Project [15] and Google Play Store [14] itself were used as exter-
nal sources of data. Numbers in brackets show the order of the steps in the process.
we designed a highly-scalable architecture that takes snapshots of the Google
Play Store at fixed intervals.
Our long-term analysis of permission evolution requires data on all the apps
in the Google Play Store. The Google Play Store Crawler (GPSC) project [15] is
concerned with exactly this, but unfortunately does not collect data on permis-
sion usage. Thus, we built our own crawler that retrieved full app data (including
permission usage) from the Google Play Store, by leveraging the list of apps from
the GPSC project. Our first snapshot of the Google Play Store (taken in this
way) was taken in March 2015 with subsequent snapshots taken (at the same
time of the month) every three months (quarterly) after the initial snapshot.
Additionally, we leveraged a corpus of apps [5] obtained using the PlayDrone
tool [22], to obtain an earlier snapshot of permission usage in the Google Play
Store as at October 2014. The most recent snapshot used in our analysis is
that of June 2016, for a total of seven snapshots (October-2014, March-2015,
June-2015, September-2015, December-2015, March-2016, June-2016) cov-
ering a 20-month period. All snapshots are 3-months (quarterly) apart ex-
cept the first two which are 5-months apart because we append the snapshot
(October-2014) from prior work [5]. We are careful to omit this first snapshot
in some cases, such as when we quantify quarterly (3-month) changes across the
Google Play Store.
In taking snapshots, our intention is to have the entire Store1 crawled as
quickly as possible. To this end, we developed a cloud-based crawler, with ge-
ographically distributed worker nodes fetching app data and returning it to a
command and control server. This is shown in Fig. 1. Our worker nodes make
app store queries with random valid User-Agent strings and are rate limited to
1 We use the terms Google Play Store, Store and app store interchangeably.
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3 requests/second, to prevent blocking by the Google Play Store. Using a small-
scale deployment with 3-4 workers, we can retrieve complete app data from the
Google Play Store in less than 48 hours. Our most recent snapshot2 of the Google
Play Store, at the time of writing, contains 26.5GB of data on 2,003,739 apps
available for download, and 728,445 apps that are no longer present in the Store.
With each new snapshot of the Google Play Store that we prepare to take,
we carry-over the entire list of apps from the previous snapshot, and append
any new apps that have been added to the store. Our system is informed of new
additions to the Store from the GPSC project and our own crawlers. Apps that
have been removed from the Google Play Store remain in our database, with an
indicator that they are no longer available. Thus the number of apps in each of
our snapshots monotonically increases as time progresses.
4 Results
4.1 Overview of the Google Play Store
For generating the following overview of the Google Play Store, we leveraged
our most current snapshot, i.e., June-2016. Table 1 shows the popularity of
permissions across all apps. The most popular permissions relate to reading
from/writing to external storage on a device (59.3%/58.7% respectively), reading
the current state of the device (33.7%), and getting the user’s fine/coarse location
(25.3%/24.3%). Fig. 2 shows the number of permissions used across all apps. The
largest number of apps (29.1%) used no permissions, while using two (16.6%),
three (13.9%), and four (10.8%) permissions was most common among apps that
used permissions. Approximately 71% of apps used one or more permissions.
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Fig. 2. Number of permissions used per app across the Google Play Store. Approxi-
mately 71% of apps use one or more permissions.
Fig. 3 shows the average number of permissions used by apps based on the
category that they were listed under. COMMUNICATION and BUSINESS were the
most permission-hungry categories, using an average of 4.9 and 4.7 permissions
2 Data from all our snapshots of the Google Play Store is available upon request.
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Table 1. Prevalence of permission usage across the Google Play Store.
READ EXTERNAL STORAGE 59.3%
WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE 58.7%
READ PHONE STATE 33.7%
ACCESS FINE LOCATION 25.3%
ACCESS COARSE LOCATION 24.3%
GET ACCOUNTS 23.6%
CAMERA 15.8%
RECORD AUDIO 8.74%
CALL PHONE 8.43%
READ CONTACTS 6.14%
SEND SMS 3.63%
WRITE CONTACTS 3.05%
RECEIVE SMS 2.45%
READ CALL LOG 2.45%
READ CALENDAR 2.18%
WRITE CALL LOG 1.45%
WRITE CALENDAR 1.35%
READ SMS 1.24%
PROCESS OUTGOING CALLS 0.923%
RECEIVE MMS 0.128%
USE SIP 0.118%
BODY SENSORS 0.017%
RECEIVE WAP PUSH 0.008%
ADD VOICEMAIL 0.0007%
respectively. The other end of the spectrum was predominantly games, with
the overall least permission-hungry category of app being GAME BOARD using an
average of 1.5 permissions per app. Fig. 4 shows how many permissions were used
based on the number of downloads that an app had. Up to 1M downloads, the
average app used approximately 2.5-3 permissions. Above 10K downloads, apps
had permission usage that monotonically increased from 2.5 to 8.5 permissions
for the most popular apps (1B downloads or more).
4.2 Permission Changes Over Time
Fig. 5 shows how permission usage changed across the Google Play Store over
the 20-month period of October-2014 to June-2016. For this analysis, we used
only those apps that were in all snapshots over the entire period. We analysed
permission usage based on the number of downloads of an app. We divided
apps into three categories based on their total number of downloads: 1-1K (low
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Fig. 3. Average number of permissions used per category of app.
1
-5
5
-1
0
1
0
-5
0
5
0
-1
0
0
1
0
0
-5
0
0
5
0
0
-1
K
1
K
-5
K
5
K
-1
0
K
1
0
K
-5
0
K
5
0
K
-1
0
0
K
1
0
0
K
-5
0
0
K
5
0
0
K
-1
M
1
M
-5
M
5
M
-1
0
M
1
0
M
-5
0
M
5
0
M
-1
0
0
M
1
0
0
M
-5
0
0
M
5
0
0
M
-1
B
1
B
-5
B
Number of app downloads
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
A
vg
. 
#
 o
f 
p
er
m
is
si
on
s
Fig. 4. Average number of permissions used per number of downloads of app. K =
thousand, M = million, B = billion.
downloads), 1K-1M (medium downloads), and 1M-5B (high downloads). Across
all snapshots, every category of app had an increase in the number of permissions
used. Overall, we found that apps in the high downloads category had the highest
increase in permission usage over the 20-month period, going from 5.1 to 5.5
permissions on average. Apps in the medium downloads category went from
using 2.44 to 2.54 permissions on average. Apps in the low downloads category
had the lowest increase in permission usage, going from 3.47 to 3.50 over the
studied period. In terms of absolute change in the number of permissions used,
more popular apps had the greater increase. While the absolute change in mean
permission usage overall seems small, it is important to remember that these
numbers reflect the aggregate permission change across all apps in the Google
Play Store, including those apps that were not updated at all. At the granularity
of individual apps, addition of several permissions between snapshots is not
uncommon, as we show later in this section.
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Fig. 5. Permission usage over time by number of downloads. Less downloaded apps
had a greater increase in the number of permissions used.
We analysed permission increase/decrease at the app level to understand
how many permissions individual apps were adding or removing when they were
updated3. We observed that a majority (86%) of apps did not get updated be-
tween snapshots of the Google Play Store. In the following analysis, we include
only those apps that were updated, to understand what changes in permission
usage, if any, were made when apps were updated. Table 2 shows the break-
down of permission changes across our quarterly snapshots for those apps that
were updated. In the table, each date shows the permission changes between
that snapshot and the previous snapshot. Note that we omit the October-2014
snapshot in this analysis because it was 5-months from its subsequent snap-
shot instead of 3-months. The table details the amount of permissions that were
added/removed across the apps. From the table, the majority of apps (on aver-
age 78.9%) did not have any change in permission usage between snapshots. For
apps that did have changes, the most likely change (7.1% of apps on average)
was to add one new permission (+1). Averaging permission changes across our
20-months of data, 13.2% (approximately 25,000) of apps added one or more
new permissions every 3-months, while only 7.9% of apps removed one or more
permissions. That is, approximately twice (1.7) as many apps required an in-
creased number of permissions than those that required a decrease, over the
studied period.
We analysed the permissions that were added to apps when they were
updated, to understand the potential erosion in privacy caused. This result
is presented in Fig. 6. From the figure, we can see that the Top 5 per-
missions that were added were WRITE CALENDAR, ACCESS COARSE LOCATION,
READ EXTERNAL STORAGE, WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE, and GET ACCOUNTS. These
permissions allow an app access to write to a user’s calendar events, access their
general location, read from and write to their external storage, and access the
3 We used a change in an app’s version or file size (as reported in the Google Play
Store) between one snapshot and the subsequent snapshot as a proxy to determine
whether an app was updated.
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Table 2. Table showing how permission usage changed between quarters for those
apps that were updated. Approximately twice as many apps added permissions than
removed permissions.
Jun-15 Sep-15 Dec-15 Mar-16 Jun-16
Total Increase 11.82% 16.23% 13.82% 12.50% 11.66%
+6 or More 0.24% 0.25% 0.23% 0.21% 0.23%
+5 0.15% 0.22% 0.25% 0.19% 0.13%
+4 0.55% 0.80% 0.67% 0.55% 0.40%
+3 1.25% 1.50% 1.45% 1.20% 1.12%
+2 3.21% 4.65% 4.03% 3.50% 3.50%
+1 6.42% 8.81% 7.19% 6.85% 6.28%
No Change 82.19% 78.20% 77.21% 78.27% 78.51%
-1 3.03% 2.95% 5.72% 5.16% 4.84%
-2 1.82% 1.45% 1.62% 2.31% 3.19%
-3 0.53% 0.56% 0.99% 1.03% 1.04%
-4 0.21% 0.22% 0.34% 0.39% 0.40%
-5 0.12% 0.11% 0.12% 0.13% 0.14%
-6 or Less 0.28% 0.28% 0.18% 0.21% 0.22%
Total Decrease 5.99% 5.57% 8.97% 9.23% 9.83%
list of accounts (in the Accounts Service) on the user’s device [3]. Android auto-
matically grants new permissions if the user has already accepted a permission
from the same permission group [4]. Thus, the Top 5 added permissions also
allow an app to read a user’s calendar and get their precise location. In general,
the most commonly added permissions allowed apps to read additional sensitive
data from a device.
Fig. 7 shows which permissions were removed the most. The most com-
monly removed permission was WRITE CALENDAR, covering approximately 18%
of the incidents of permission removal from apps. It is interesting to note that
WRITE CALENDAR was both the most frequently added and most frequently re-
moved permission. This may be due to developer confusion about the necessity of
the particular permission. Such developer confusion regarding permission usage
was also observed by Felt et al. [10].
5 Analysis
5.1 Patterns in permission addition and removal
Our findings so far have examined aggregate permission evolution at the macro-
level. We now use a technique similar to Wei et al. [23], to understand permission
evolution at the micro-level. Specifically, we leverage patterns to better under-
stand permission addition and removal by developers at the app level. Patterns
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Fig. 6. Breakdown of the newly added permissions across the Google Play Store.
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Fig. 7. Breakdown of the newly removed permissions across the Google Play Store.
are written using the digits 0 and 1 where a 0 represents the state that an app
does not use a permission and 1 represents the state where an app uses a permis-
sion. Transitions between states are represented using a →. Thus, the simplest
event where an app goes from not using a permission to using a permission can
be illustrated as 0→1. Using this idea of permission state transitions, we created
what we call Permission Evolution Matrices (PEMs) by looking at permission
usage in apps across snapshots of the Google Play Store. Using PEMs we can
easily identify patterns in permission evolution. An example of the PEM for an
app is shown in Table 3.
We evaluated the PEMs for all apps looking for interesting patterns such as
0→1→0. We consider the pattern 0→1→0 to be interesting because it means
that an app without a particular permission first added the permission, then
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Table 3. Example of an (abridged) permission evolution matrix (PEM). The pattern
0→1→0→1 for the READ PHONE STATE permission can be seen.
Permission Mar-15 Jun-15 Sep-15 Dec-15 Mar-16 Jun-16
READ PHONE STATE 0 0 1 0 1 1
SEND SMS 1 1 1 1 1 1
READ SMS 1 1 1 1 1 1
CALL PHONE 0 0 0 0 0 0
GET ACCOUNTS 0 0 0 0 0 0
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
READ CONTACTS 1 1 1 1 1 1
removed it shortly after. This is strange behaviour and may suggest app devel-
oper confusion regarding the necessity of the permission in question. This could
also be caused by the requirements of the libraries used by an app, however we
consider this unlikely since, from observation, libraries tend to have constant (or
increasing) permission usage, but an oscillation is unusual.
Table 4 shows incidences of apps with the pattern 0→1→0. The most com-
mon oscillating permissions that read data from a smartphone were GET ACCOUNTS,
ACCESS COARSE LOCATION, and READ EXTERNAL STORAGE. These permissions al-
low an app to get a user’s general location, get the names/email addresses of
accounts on the device, and read files located on external storage such as an
SD card. The existence of the pattern 0→1→0 for an app suggests that the
app may have been over-privileged for a period of time before the developers
corrected the error, since we deem it unlikely that developers would be adding
and removing features (needing permissions) so rapidly. Also, we consider the
number of occurrences of patterns reported here to be a lower bound, because
the granularity of our snapshots was 3-months. Indeed, more granular snapshots
may have revealed more ephemeral patterns.
We further analysed the apps that had the interesting permission transi-
tion pattern 0→1→0. Overwhelmingly, 96.5% of these apps were free apps and
81% of them had less than 50,000 downloads. Thus, it seems that fledgling apps
(and their developers) disproportionately suffer from the permission usage oscil-
lations that we discovered, again pointing to lack of understanding or expertise.
Note however, that it was not only fledgling apps that had trouble with permis-
sion usage oscillations. Indeed, nine apps with 100M-500M downloads had oscil-
lating permissions. For example, com.avast.android.mobilesecurity briefly
used ACCESS COARSE LOCATION, while com.ijinshan.kbatterydoctor en and
vStudio.Android.Camera360 briefly used the GET ACCOUNTS permission.
Permission usage information is directly extracted from an app’s manifest file
by the Google Play Store. Thus, an app may not actually use a listed permission
internally; it may have only been added to the package manifest. In any case,
this is cause for concern because it is a sign of developer error. Moreover, even
if this permission was not used by the app, it would still increase the attack
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Table 4. Number of incidences of apps with the pattern 0→1→0.
Permission Number of incidences
WRITE CALENDAR 7574
ACCESS COARSE LOCATION 3151
GET ACCOUNTS 1433
WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE 977
READ EXTERNAL STORAGE 954
READ PHONE STATE 916
ACCESS FINE LOCATION 558
RECORD AUDIO 305
READ CONTACTS 210
CAMERA 178
READ CALL LOG 165
CALL PHONE 152
WRITE CONTACTS 89
READ CALENDAR 73
RECEIVE SMS 70
SEND SMS 57
WRITE CALL LOG 54
READ SMS 48
PROCESS OUTGOING CALLS 28
RECEIVE MMS 5
ADD VOICEMAIL 2
USE SIP 2
RECEIVE WAP PUSH 2
BODY SENSORS 1
surface of the app and smartphone if, for example, the app had vulnerabilities
or used dynamic code loading (or other low-level functionality) that could be
exploited by an adversary. Also, apps asking for unnecessary permissions condi-
tion users to accept many permission requests, which is already a problem. As
mentioned above, even very popular apps suffer from this problem of fluctuating
permissions, potentially affecting a non-trivial portion of the ecosystem.
5.2 Impact of the cost of an app
We examined the impact, if any, that the cost (free or paid) of an app had on
its likelihood to add new permissions over time. Table 5 shows a breakdown of
incidents where permissions were added to apps based on their cost.
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Table 5. Aggregated list of incidents where permissions were added, broken down by
whether an app was free or paid.
Increase Free Free (%) Paid Paid (%)
1 49858 95.7% 2233 4.3%
2 20011 94.6% 1142 5.4%
3 6914 96.2% 276 3.8%
4 3387 96.8% 111 3.2%
5 1071 97.3% 30 2.7%
6 473 97.1% 14 2.9%
7 229 99.6% 1 0.4%
8 122 98.4% 2 1.6%
9 75 72.8% 28 27.2%
10+ 164 62.6% 98 37.4%
Total 82304 95.4% 3935 4.6%
Hypothesis 1: Free apps are more likely to add new permissions than
paid apps.
We wanted to determine whether there was a statistically significant difference
between free vs. paid apps when it came to adding new permissions. We tested
this using a 2-proportion z-test with a sample size of 20,000, at a significance
level of 0.01. The data from our random sample of the dataset is shown in Ta-
ble 6. Our result showed p < 0.01, suggesting that free apps were more likely
than their paid counterparts to add new permissions over time. This result, per-
haps seemingly intuitive and unsurprising to some, has not been shown before
in the literature. Free apps tend to be ad-supported and thus could be adding
more permissions to satisfy the needs of advertising libraries. If so, this is cause
for concern, and underscores the need for privilege separation between apps and
their ad libraries [19].
Table 6. Results of the random sample (n = 20, 000) of apps based on their cost.
Total Apps Apps adding permissions
Free 17913 861
Paid 2087 44
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5.3 Impact of the popularity of an app
Next, we examined the impact that the popularity (number of downloads) of
an app had on permission usage over time. Table 7 breaks down incidents4 of
permissions being added, based on app popularity (whether an app had Low or
High downloads).
Hypothesis 2: Popular apps are more likely to add new permissions
than less popular apps.
As in Section 4.2, we considered 1-million downloads as the threshold above
which an app was placed in the High category. We used a 2-proportion z-test
with a sample size of 20,000, and significance level of 0.01 to determine whether
there was a statistically significant difference between apps with Low and High
downloads when it came to adding new permissions. The data from our random
sample of the dataset is shown in Table 8. Our result showed p < 0.01, sug-
gesting that apps in the High downloads category were more likely to add new
permissions over time. This result has also never been shown in the literature.
It is somewhat concerning that very popular apps are adding new permissions
to a greater extent than less popular apps. This is because it means that a large
cross-section of users (those using very popular apps) will use apps with a larger
attack surface. We expect that the developers of very popular apps take user
privacy and security seriously and this mitigates the risk somewhat. In other
worrying cases, some very popular apps (e.g. flashlight, alarm clock) are devel-
oped by small teams or individuals who may not have the knowledge, desire or
capacity to write their apps according to best practices, and increase the risk
to users when their apps leverage additional permissions. Additionally, if very
popular apps are the ones most likely to use new permissions, it means that
large swathes of users face the risk of being conditioned to automatically accept
permission requests.
6 Discussion
Our focus throughout this paper was to understand how permission usage in
the Android ecosystem evolves over time. While run-time permission requests
put more power into the hands of the end-user, Eling et al. [9] show that a
substantial portion of users still blindly accept permission requests when they
are confronted with them. Thus, it is important to understand the current state
of the app ecosystem (in terms of permission usage by apps) and where it may
likely progress to in the future. We were interested in understanding whether
4 The discrepancy of 58 between the total number of incidents in Table 5 and Table 7
is caused by errors in the data obtained from the Google Play Store. These errors
prevent us from accurately parsing the number of downloads for 58 apps, and thus
these apps have been omitted.
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Table 7. Aggregated list of incidents where permissions were added, broken down by
number of downloads. Low refers to apps having less than 1-million downloads while
High refers to apps with more than 1-million downloads.
Increase Low Low (%) High High (%)
1 49719 95.5% 2321 4.5%
2 20200 95.6% 938 4.4%
3 6869 95.5% 321 4.5%
4 3373 96.4% 125 3.6%
5 1047 95.5% 49 4.5%
6 464 95.5% 22 4.5%
7 236 96.7% 8 3.3%
8 115 92.7% 9 7.3%
9 101 98.1% 2 1.9%
10+ 257 98.1% 5 1.9%
Total 82381 95.6% 3800 4.4%
Table 8. Results of the random sample (n = 20, 000) of apps based on their popularity.
Total Apps Apps adding permissions
Low Downloads 19534 905
High Downloads 202 37
the cost (free vs. paid) or popularity (number of downloads) of an app had any
bearing on the usage/evolution of permissions. We were also interested in de-
tecting interesting phenomena, such as permission usage patterns, that could
signify developer error in specifying permissions. We only focused on danger-
ous permissions, those permissions defined by the Android operating system as
guarding sensitive user data. We ignored changes in normal permissions because
these permissions, if abused, only cause minor annoyance to a user, as opposed
to putting their personal data at risk.
The addition of new permissions is not inherently bad, as many apps have
legitimate reasons to request additional access to user data. However, many
apps and ad libraries are also known to abuse their granted permissions for the
purposes of profiling users and/or directly stealing their data. Regardless of the
intent of the app developer when adding new permissions, more highly-privileged
apps contribute to a greater attack surface on the smartphone as well as attract
the attention of adversaries.
We first looked at the average number of permissions used by apps across the
Google Play Store based on the popularity of an app. We found that very popular
apps (those with in excess of one million downloads) used more permissions than
those with less downloads. This could be due to the fact that they provide more
functionality, and hence why they are popular in the first place. Thus popular
apps may be more attractive to adversaries since they offer a greater attack
Quantifying Permission-Creep in the Google Play Store 17
surface and are more widely installed. Looking at apps that were present across
all our snapshots, we observed that more popular apps had a greater overall
increase in average permission usage.
We attempted to understand the frequency of app updates and the extent
to which permissions were added (or removed) when apps were updated. Un-
surprisingly, we observed that the majority of apps (86%) did not get updated
between Store snapshots. Of the apps that did get updated, approximately four
out of five of them did not have any change in their permission requirements.
However, 13.2% of the apps that were updated now needed one or more new
permissions. This corresponds to approximately 25,000 apps needing new per-
missions every three months. We discovered that apps were more likely to add
new permissions than remove permissions, overall pointing to greater access to
personal data by apps. This can obviously contribute to an erosion in privacy,
but the security impacts also need to be considered since highly-privileged apps
are more attractive targets to adversaries.
We looked at patterns in permission usage as apps evolved across our dataset.
Specifically, we looked for oscillations in permission usage, as this can be consid-
ered strange behaviour. We found that free apps and those with fewer downloads
disproportionally suffered from this phenomenon, potentially pointing to lack of
developer expertise or confusion about what permissions were actually needed.
We also found that some popular apps suffered from this problem, showing that
no set of apps/app developers is immune.
We conducted hypothesis tests to determine whether the cost of an app had
any impact on its likelihood to add new permissions. We found statistically
significant evidence that free apps were more likely to add new permissions than
paid apps. This could be as a result of the advertising libraries that are usually
included with free apps, which leverage personal data to provide more targeted
advertisements. Whether it is the app or the ad library that leverages these new
permissions, the fact remains that there is now additional opportunity for user
data to be abused. We tested whether the popularity of an app had an impact
on how likely the app was to add new permissions. Our data showed that more
popular apps were more likely to add new permissions over. This is worrying,
because it means that a large segment of users in the Android ecosystem are
potentially exposed to additional privacy/security risks simply as a result of
using and updating popular apps.
6.1 Limitations
In this work, we took snapshots of the Google Play Store at 3-month intervals.
While this is useful for getting an overall picture of the Store, it may not be
granular enough to capture short-term phenomena when they happen. In looking
at permission usage, we are relying on the information reported in the Google
Play Store regarding the permissions listed in an app’s manifest. There is no way
to easily disaggregate and understand whether the app or its included libraries
were responsible for using these permissions. However, regardless of whether
it is the app or libraries using the permission, high-privilege in apps increases
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the attack surface for that app and the smartphone it is installed on, as well as
attracts the attention of adversaries. Moreover, since privileges are not separated
between apps and their libraries, either is free to leverage the access it has been
granted at the expense of the user.
6.2 Future Work
For future work, we plan to continue the collection of our snapshots of data as
well as increase the frequency of snapshot collection. We also plan to look at
additional metrics beyond permission usage that would allow a more compre-
hensive understanding of how the app ecosystem is evolving.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we did a longitudinal analysis of permission evolution in apps by
taking quarterly snapshots of the Google Play Store over a 20-month period.
Our analysis showed that the average number of permissions used by apps in-
creased over the period, with more popular apps having a greater increase. Of
the apps that do have changes in their permission requirements, the most likely
change was the addition of a new permission. We observed that almost twice
as many apps added new permissions as those that removed permissions. We
did hypothesis testing and observed that free apps and popular (apps with more
than one million downloads) apps were more likely to add new permissions over
time. We also found oscillation in permission usage, which suggests that app de-
velopers may still be confused about what permissions their apps require. This
has the potential to make apps over-privileged and unnecessarily increase the
attack surface. By performing this longitudinal study, we have confirmed and
highlighted several important trends in app permission usage across the Google
Play Store; never before done in the literature. By drawing these trends to the
attention of the research community, we hope to generate additional interest in
the area, so that appropriate strategies can be developed to keep sensitive user
data safe, as smartphones continue their growth to ubiquity.
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